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I. INTRODUCTION
'We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
much as a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these
comparable circumstances."
Chief Justice William Rehnquistt
The last two decades have seen a dramatic change in the United States
Supreme Court's analysis of regulations affecting private property. While govem-
mental actions affecting private property were formerly subjected only to the
minimal scrutiny standards of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses,2 the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment? has risen to its rightful place of prominence and offers newly recognized
protections for private property.4
The Just Compensation Clause, which prior to the Agins v. City of Tiburon5
line of cases6 went ignored and underutilized, offers protections different in Idnd
from those of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.7 While sub-
1. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994).
2. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (holding that a town "safety regulation"
preventing the continued operation of a sand and gravel mine is valid because it is a reasonable exercise of the
police power); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,411 (1915) (upholding a city ordinance that prohibited
the manufacture of bricks as a valid exercise of the police power since the only limitation upon such power was
that it could not be exerted arbitrarily or with unjust discrimination); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I
("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in pertinent part that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use without just compensation").
4. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987);
see discussion infra Parts II.B., C. (examining the development of the conjunctive test and the Supreme Court's
recognition of the Fifth Amendment's property protections).
5. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
6. This line of cases, discussed infra Part II, served to resurrect the Fifth Amendment Just
Compensation Clause, and is complementary to the protections afforded landowners under due process.
7. Factual scenarios, such as those present in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), and
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), arguably could have supported Fifth Amendment just
compensation claims. Although such claims were advanced by the Goldblatt plaintiffs, the Supreme Court
concluded that the ordinance in question was a valid exercise of the police power without utilizing a just
compensation analysis. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594.
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stantive due process protects persons from arbitrary or capricious government
action, and may be used to challenge the validity of a regulation, the Just Com-
pensation Clause is implicated when the regulation of property substantially
interferes with owners' use and enjoyment of their property, and thus, rises to the
level of a "taking."8 If the regulation goes "too far"9 and rises to the level of a
"taking," the question then becomes how much compensation is owed to the
landowner.10
This is where confusion often arises. Judges, attorneys and commentators
alike may fail to recognize that the issue of whether a regulation "goes too far"
and thus effects a "taking" of private property, is distinct from the due process
question of whether the regulation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest and is thus a valid exercise of the police power." Although a
regulation enacted pursuant to the government's police power may satisfy the
rational relationship standard applicable to due process claims, the regulation may
nonetheless so substantially interfere with owners' use and enjoyment of their
property, that just compensation will be required under the Fifth Amendment.2
8. A "taking" of property may occur when governmental action substantially interferes with an
owner's use and enjoyment of the property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 105
(1978). Moreover, governmental interference with an owner's use and enjoyment can ripen into a "takings"
claim without a physical invasion or appropriation of the property. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 413 (1922). For example, a "taking" may be effected by an ordinance that denies the owner
economically viable use of the land. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
Not all governmental actions affecting property require compensation, but when the interference reaches a
certain magnitude, just compensation must be paid. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
9. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: "The general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
10. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,257 (1980) (characterizing the Just Compensation Clause
as "self-executing," meaning that once private property is "taken" compensation must be awarded); see also
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (stating that once there is a taking, whether there has been a
formal condemnation proceeding instituted or not, compensation must be awarded because there is a duty
imposed by the Fifth Amendment).
11. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (stating that the Court "refuse[s] to sit as a
superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation" (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421,423 (1952))); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,487 (1955) (holding that economic
regulations will be upheld if the legislature "might of concluded" that the regulation promoted the public
health, safety, or welfare; and that it is irrelevant whether or not any interest is actually advanced); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that minimal scrutiny is appropriate for
economic regulations because of a presumption of their constitutionality due to the ordinariness of the
legislation and their adoption through the regular political process).
12. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,647-53 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an otherwise valid exercise of police power can result in an unconstitutional taking
of property without just compensation); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (stating that the determination that a
governmental action constitutes a taking is a determination that the public, rather than a single owner, must
bear the burden of an exercise of state police power in the public's interest); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (stating
that "governmental action in the form of regulation [can] be so onerous as to constitute a taking which
constitutionally requires compensation," although the Court refused to entertain arguments based upon the Fifth
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In essence, the determination that just compensation is owing is a determination
that the government should have exercised its power of eminent domain 3 and
paid for the property interests it has taken. 4
The Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with Agins, has sought to
clarify what is required under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and to distinguish it from the minimal scrutiny used under a substantive due
process protections analysis applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.' 5 The Agins line of cases developed a two-pronged disjunctive
test for the analysis of regulatory takings claims.' 6 Under this two-pronged test,
a regulation effects a taking if it fails to either substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of the owner's land.'
7
Thus, for the court to compensate a landowner for a taking, the regulation need
only fail one of the two prongs.'8
This newly articulated change from the deferential substantive due process
standard to the more demanding just compensation standard has not gone un-
noticed.' 9 However, despite repeated attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify
Amendment).
13. Eminent domain is a legal proceeding in which a governmental entity asserts its authority to
condemn property. See Clarke, 445 U.S. at 255-58.
14. Id.
15. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36 n.4. But see Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Just Compensation Clause analysis employed by the majority is in
reality a resurrection of Lochner-era substantive due process); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process
Resurrected Through The Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVm. L. 155, 160 (1995)
(asserting that Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich represent a resurrection of substantive due process which is subject
to the imposition of the court's own value judgments). See generally Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (illustrating the rational relation standard of the Due Process Clause that is
applicable to economic regulations); supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining the rational relation
standard of the Due Process Clause).
16. See discussion infra Part I (illustrating the development of the disjunctive test). But see discussion
infra Part UILC. (examining cases which have interpreted the Agins test as conjunctive).
17. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
18. The burden of proving the propriety of the regulation is placed upon the government. This was
implicit in the manner in which the test was stated in Nollan; however, the shift in burden was made explicit
in Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
19. An enormous amount of literature has been written examining the United States Supreme Court's
recent holdings in the area of "takings." See generally Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil
Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Cr.
REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Takings]; Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SVI. U.
L. REV. 627 (1988); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964). Additionally, many
cities and counties joined an amicus curiae brief filed in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n arguing that the
acceptance of the newly articulated recognition of Fifth Amendment protections would sound the death knell
for urban planning and land use regulations promoting public health, safety, and welfare. Brief of Designated
California Cities and Counties as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 18-20, Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see Brief of the Council of State
Governments, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties, National Confeience of State
Legislatures, International City Management Association, and National League of Cities; Joined by the
American Planning Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
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what is required under the Just Compensation Clause, and although common to
nearly all states is the recognition that the Agins two-pronged test is disjunctive,2°
the analyses vary among the many state and federal courts.2? '
In particular, California's Fourth District Court of Appeal and the Ohio
Supreme Court have produced a unique interpretation of the Just Compensation
Clause test as stated by the United States Supreme Court in Agins.2These courts
have applied the two-pronged disjunctive test conjunctively, shifting the burden
of proof from the government to the landowner and requiring the landowner to
prove the challenged regulation both fails to advance legitimate state interests
substantially and denies the owner economically viable use of the land. 23 The con-
junctive application of the Agins test is contrary to the Supreme Court's consistent
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (arguing that the imposition of the nexus
requirement, which would require that the exaction be related to the public harm caused by the landowner's
development, would severely hamper the ability of state and local governments to solve complex land use
problems).
20. Most state and federal cases recognize the disjunctive nature of the Agins test. See, e.g., Clajon
Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1576 (10th Cir. 1995); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d
1169, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1991); National Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States v. Chesterfield County,
907 F. Supp. 166, 167 (E.D. Va. 1995); Galbraith v. Planning Dep't of Anderson, 627 N.E.2d 850, 852 n.2
(Ind. CL App. 1994); Offen v. County Council for Prince George's County, Md. Sitting as the Dist. Council,
625 A.2d 424,431 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1993), rev'd, 639 A.2d 1070, 1076 (Md. 1994); Wilson v. Common-
wealth, 583 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Mass. App. CL 1992), affrd in part and rev'd in part, 597 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Mass.
1992); Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Mich. 1991); Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. of Minn.
v. City of Lakeville, 532 N.W.2d 249,253 (Minn. CL App. 1995); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n,
593 A.2d 251,257 (NJ. 1991); Moroney v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045,
1047 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1993); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479,482 (N.Y. 1994);
Miller v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 848 P.2d 629,630 & n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 634 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. Super. CL 1993); Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (Va. CL
App. 1992); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 857 P.2d 283, 296 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993);
McFillan v. Berkeley County Planning Comm'n, 438 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 1993).
21. See McAndrews v. Fleet Bank, 989 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1993) (ignoring the first prong of Agins
and proceeding under Penn Central); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716,720 (11th Cir. 1990) (dividing
claims into just compensation, due process takings, arbitrary and capricious due process, and equal protection
claims); Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 486-87 (applying the disjunctive test to invalidate a statute regulating
the use of rental properties); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065-66 (N.Y. 1989)
(applying the disjunctive standard established by the Supreme Court in a manner consistent with the Agins line
of cases); see also infra note 37 (discussing the failure of courts to distinguish between Due Process Clause
protections and Just Compensation Clause protections).
22. Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. CL 86; Central Motors v. City of Pepper Pike, 653 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio 1995); Gerijo, Inc. v. City
of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1994). These cases have reinterpreted the disjunctive standard first
announced in Agins, see infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text, as a conjunctive standard requiring a
landowner to establish that a regulation fails to serve a legitimate governmental interest and deprives the
landowner of economically viable use of the land. See discussion infra Part III.C. (discussing the adoption of
the conjunctive test).
23. See discussion infra Part III.C. (examining California's and Ohio's use of a conjunctive standard).
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reiteration of a disjunctive test 4 and leads to results which are of questionable
constitutional validity.2 For example, no recovery will be available for a plaintiff
who is completely denied economically viable use of the land if the regulation ad-
vances legitimate state interests.2 Similarly, the conjunctive standard will validate
an admittedly bad regulation which utterly fails to advance any legitimate state
interests unless the owner is also denied economically viable use of his or her
property.27
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the modem
takings standards as developed in the Agins line of cases including exemplars of
their proper application.2 This discussion is followed by an examination of the
conjunctive application of the Agins disjunctive test by the California and Ohio
courts.29 This Comment also presents a re-examination of landmark Supreme
Court cases in light of the conjunctive application of Agins, and considers the
possible effects of these state court decisions upon private property rights.3 °
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE-THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGINS DIsJuNCTIVE STANDARD
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes a
minimum level of protection for private property and is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment'.3 Although states may confer greater rights
upon individuals than those afforded under the Federal Constitution, state pro-
24. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.
1, 18 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985); see also Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14
(1984) (stating that a taling is effected if the landowner is denied economically viable use of the land).
25. See discussion infra Part V (examining the effects of the conjunctive standard upon landowners and
property rights); see also infra notes 31-32, 247-48 and accompanying text (establishing that the Fifth
Amendment provides a minimum level of protection for private property rights).
26. See infra notes 36-37,247-48 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 36-37,247-48 and accompanying text.
28. See discussion infra Parts 11, I1I.B. (discussing the development of the Agins disjunctive test and
providing examples of its proper application).
29. See discussion infra Part mI.C. (examining the use of a conjunctive test by California's Fourth
District Court of Appeal and by Ohio courts).
30. See discussion infra Parts IV-V (analyzing Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas under a conjunctive standard
and considering the possible effects upon private property rights).
31. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (incorporating the Fifth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); see also Michael J. Davis &
Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a Final Homeland for the Due
Process and Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1989) (discussing the history of the due process and
just compensation clauses and the various views of the relationship between the two). See generally William
J. Btennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535,550 (1986) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights
to the various states, "creating a federal floor of protection").
1662
1996 / Lessened Protection for Property Rights
tections may not fall below the minimum guarantees mandated by the Federal
Constitution.32
As a result of the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's protections into the
due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, landowners have available
two distinct causes of action when seeking just compensation or the invalidation
of unconstitutionally burdensome regulations: a Fifth Amendment claim for a
taking of property without just compensation under Agins, Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City,33 or Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,34 and
a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of property without due process of law
under the Supreme Court's line of substantive due process cases.35 Although the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment each offer protection of private property rights,
and both may be implicated in any single factual scenario, each possesses its own
identity and differs in standard and application ? 6 Although a regulation may
implicate both clauses, courts have historically given deference to governmental
actions and often apply only due process standards, failing to recognize that an
examination under the Just Compensation Clause may be warranted also.37 This
is where Agins and its progeny become important.
32. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law shall prevail over
state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's holding in Loretto).
35. Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a
Legal System With Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433,437-38 (1988).
36. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987) (stating that "there is
no reason to believe ... that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings
challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical"). Compare U.S. CONST.
amend V. ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation") with U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of... property without due process of law").
37. See Wiseman, supra note 35, at 437-39 (stating that courts frequently fail to distinguish between
the due process and just compensation protections of property, as well as between two possible abuses of
governmental power. "[F]irst the government may act arbitrarily in violation of due process; second, the
government may so intrusively regulate the use of property in pursuit of legitimate police power objectives as
to take the property without just compensation, in violation of the just compensation clause."). See generally
Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (1lth Cir. 1990) (applying due process standards where just
compensation standards may have been appropriate); Davis & Glicksman, supra note 31, at 394 (arguing that
the Supreme Court's difficulty with regard to the Fifth Amendment stems from a consistent failure to
differentiate between deprivations of property without due process and takings of property without just
compensation); Takings, supra note 19, at 4 (arguing that the confused and contradictory decisions of the
Supreme Court in the area of takings is due to the Court's refusal to give the Takings Clause the natural reading
that the text suggests).
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A. Agins v. City of Tiburon: The Just Compensation Clause Revived and
the Genesis of the Disjunctive Test
Modem Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to the Just Compensation
Clause begins with Agins. 5 In Agins, the landowner brought a facial challenge to
a zoning ordinance which would limit the development of his five acre property
to the construction of up to five residences. 39 The landowner had not submitted
a plan for development of the property, and therefore, the only question before
the Court was whether the enactment of the zoning ordinance constituted a
taking.4 The Court articulated a two-pronged disjunctive test to be applied in
regulatory takings cases: "[A regulation] effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.' 41 Thus, a landowner may recover for a "regulatory taking"
if the regulation fails either of the two prongs.
42
The test, although first stated in the disjunctive, may be rephrased in the
negative, thus becoming conjunctive.43 This could be called the "negative
conjunctive" form of the Agins test. Under the negative conjunctive formulation,
a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if the regulation both substantially
advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner of economically
viable use of the land.44 Logically, if a landowner need only satisfy one prong of
the test to recover, the regulation must satisfy both prongs to be deemed con-
stitutional. Reformulation in this manner does not change the meaning of the test
or alter its application.45
Although the Agins test was intended to be a Just Compensation Clause
standard, in formulating the first prong of the test, Justice Powell used the "sub-
stantial relationship" standard of the Due Process Clause as a starting point.!
6
Thus, the view that the first prong should be analyzed under due process
38. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
39. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
40. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
42. Id.
43. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (stating the Agins test in the negative conjunctive form); see also Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (reiterating the Agins test in the negative conjunctive form).
44. No~lan, 483 U.S. at 834.
45. See id. (utilizing the negative conjunctive form of the Agins test).
46. The language of the first prong was based upon the following due process cases: Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) (stating that a regulation cannot be imposed if it does not bear a
"substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare") (emphasis
added), and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (stating that a regulation is
unconstitutional if its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare") (emphasis added). See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
1664
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standards is not wholly specious.47 The mingling of due process and just com-
pensation language belies the Court's continued difficulty in determining what is
required under the Just Compensation Clause. However, the first prong, in light
of later authority, is clearly intended as a just compensation standard, rather than
a due process standard, and is to be invoked when a landowner is singled out to
disproportionately bear societal burdens.s Justice Scalia, writing for the majority
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,4 9 sought to dispel the notion that the
first prong of Agins was to be evaluated using due process precepts.
50
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: Distinguishing Just Com-
pensation from Due Process
Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the Court, applied the two-pronged
Agins test to the California Coastal Commission's requirements that conditioned
the issuance of the Nollans' building permit on the exaction t (some may say
extortion)52 of an easement across their property.53 Justice Scalia's opinion
provided two important refinements of the first prong of Agins. First, the Nollan
opinion clarified what is required under the first prong of Agins when it is applied
47. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; supra note 46 (discussing the use of due process language as a starting
point for the development of the disjunctive test); see also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 160 (arguing that Nollan,
Dolan, and Ehrlich are actually substantive due process cases, rather than Just Compensation Clause cases).
48. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; discussion infra Part II.B. (examining the Court's decision in Nollan
and Justice Scalia's attempt to differentiate the first prong of the Agins test from due process standards).
49. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
50. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
51. See BLACK'S LAwDIcIONARY 557 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an "exaction" as "[t]he wrongful act
of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or reward for his services, under color of his
official authority, where no payment is due").
52. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (stating that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out
plan of extortion"' (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981))).
53. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. The permit condition imposed upon the landowners would require the
granting of an easement in favor of the public that would allow the public to pass along the Nollans' property
above the mean high tide line but below the landowners' seawall. Id. at 828.
Article X, section 4 of the California Constitution guarantees the public's right to access to beaches and
navigable waters by explicitly incorporating the public trust doctrine. Article X, section 4 provides that:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a
harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the
right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct
the free navigation of such water, and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall
always be attainable for the people thereof.
Under the public trust doctrine, owners of land adjacent to navigable waters own the land subject to a
trust interest on behalf of the public in tidelands and in lands between the high and low water marks in nontidal
navigable lakes. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 291, 644 P.2d 792,
793-94, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599,600-01 (1982); Carstens v. California Coastal Comm'n, 182 Cal. App. 3d 277,288,
227 Cal. Rptr. 135, 142-43 (1986).
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to exactions.54 Second, the Nollan opinion attempted to dispel the notion that the
first prong was a due process standard requiring only minimal scrutiny
s5
Under the first prong of Agins, the regulation must substantially advance
legitimate state interests if it is to comport with the Just Compensation Clause.56
The municipal zoning ordinance at issue in Agins however, was quite different
from the regulations at issue in Nollan. The regulations in Nollan, like Agins,
were part of a comprehensive scheme to regulate land use; however, the regu-
lations at issue in Nollan authorized the exercise of discretion by the California
Coastal Commission to condition the issuance of coastal development permits on
the exaction of easements across landowners' property. 7 Concomitant with the
discretion present in Nollan was the danger that the discretion and permit con-
ditions would be used for impermissible purposes. 8 The heightened danger of
governmental abuse justified some form of heightened scrutiny over and above
the easily satisfied "substantially advance" requirement articulated in Agins. 9
In the majority's view, where exactions are imposed upon landowners,
satisfaction of the "substantially advance legitimate state interests" requirement
applicable to zoning ordinances would not be enough to satisfy the Just Compen-
sation Clause: The majority would also require a "nexus" between the condition
imposed and the justification for the regulation. This does not mean that any
asserted governmental interest is enough to serve as the justification for the regu-
lation; the justification for the regulation must be the mitigation of harm caused
by the landowner's development activities.6 '
54. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also John J. Delaney, What Does It Take to Make a Take? A Post-
Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, 25 URB. LAW. 55
(1995) (characterizing Nollan and Dolan as exactions cases).
55. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing examples of results
under due process standards).
56. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
57. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828; see CAL PtuB. RES. CODE §§ 30106,30212,30600 (West 1986) (providing
the California Coastal Commission with the discretionary ability to condition the development of private
coastal lands upon the granting of an easement from the public roadway to the beach and along the coast); see
also Agins, 447 U.S. at 257 (discussing zoning ordinances that limited the development of the landowner's
property to single-family dwellings and that allowed only one to five dwellings on their five-acre tract).
58. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4, 837 & n.5, 841; see Dan Walters, Best Intentions Can Go Wrong,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 2, 1996, at A3 (asserting that the Coastal Act implemented by the California Coastal
Commission created an opportunity for political abuse). For example, federal investigators caught Mark
Nathanson, a coastal commissioner, extorting payoffs from property owners in exchange for approval of
projects. See id.
59. The Court stated that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations, including zoning
and landmark preservation, satisfied the requirement that regulations substantially advance legitimate state
interests. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-36.
60. Id. at 837.
61. The majority would require the permit condition to serve the same governmental interest as a
development ban on the property. Id. at 836-37. If the development ban would serve to prevent some form of
public harm, the permit condition must serve to prevent the same public harm. Id. Therefore, the justification
for the regulation must be the mitigation or prevention of public harm caused by the development. Id.
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Thus, in exaction scenarios, to satisfy the first prong of Agins and the Just
Compensation Clause, the advancement of legitimate state interests may not be
speculative or imaginative as permitted under substantive due process,62 but must
be "substantial" and bear a nexus to the harm caused by the landowner's
development of the property.63 To do otherwise would be to sanction the use of
regulations that serve only as a pretext to obtain interests in land without the pay-
ment of just compensation.64
Justice Brennan, whom Justice Marshall joined in dissent, believed the
standard articulated by the majority was unprecedented65 and argued for what is
best described as a "minimum-rationality" due process or equal protection stan-
dard.66 Justice Brennan's inquiry into the validity of the permit condition would
have ended with whether the Coastal Commission "could rationally have
decided" the condition might achieve the objective of preserving public access to
the beach.67 Refusing to acknowledge any distinction between standards of review
under the Just Compensation or Due Process Clauses, Justice Brennan argued that
where the rationality of governmental action is at issue, the inquiry is always the
same despite semantical differences. 68 This argument begs the question: Cannot
government act rationally, yet take property without providing compensation?
Attempting to address this problem with his argument, Justice Brennan conceded
for a moment that valid exercises of the police power may still violate specific
provisions of the Constitution, thus requiring review under standards other than
the rational basis standard.69 However, in his view, the more stringent standards
applicable under other constitutional provisions are inapplicable here, where the
issue is the rationality of government action.70 To demonstrate that review under
other constitutional provisions would be unwarranted. Justice Brennan then pro-
ceeded with a facile review under Penn Central, concluding that in his view, none
62. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (stating that under the minimal
scrutiny standard, a regulation affecting economic interests will be upheld if the legislature "might have
concluded" the regulation was necessary to promote state interests and that it is irrelevant whether any interest
is actually advanced).
63. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
64. Id. at 837.
65. Justice Brennan characterized the standard articulated by the Court as a revival of Lochner-era
substantive due process, which had long been abandoned. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466
(1981)).
68. Id. at 843 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Justice Brennan argued that Penn Central provided an alternative framework that protected the
values underlying the Just Compensation Clause, but that the standard of review remained the rational basis
standard. Id. However, this conclusion is unsupported by Penn Central. In Penn Central, the Court considered
the economic impact upon the landowner, the interference with legitimate investment backed expectations, and
the character of the governmental action, not merely whether there was a rational basis for the regulation. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 n.1, 854 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of the interests protected by the Just Compensation Clause were implicated by the
permit condition.7'
In response to Justice Brennan's argument that the minimum rationality due
process standard was applicable, Justice Scalia maintained that the takings
standards are not the same as due process or equal protection standards! 2 The
Agins requirement that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state
interest" sought to be achieved is different ftom whether the state "rationally
could have decided" that the regulation might advance the state's interests.?
3
Although the Court may have previously appeared to assume that the two in-
quiries were the same, Justice Scalia stated that this assumption was inconsistent
with later cases.74 The Just Compensation Clause, as incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, will not be satisfied by speculation or conjecture as the
Due Process Clause may be, but requires more: The government must show that
the regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests.!
5
Nollan, in addition to distinguishing the Just Compensation Clause from the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, also reinforced the disjunctive nature
of the two-pronged test formulated in Agins. Although Justice Scalia stated the
Agins test in the negative conjunctive,76 the inquiry remained the same: The
government needs to fail to prove only that the regulation substantially advances
legitimate state interests for the landowner to prevail. 7 The majority based its
decision solely on the first prong, concluding that the regulation failed to advance
substantially legitimate state interests?8 The majority found it unnecessary to
examine whether the Coastal Commission's actions denied the Nollans econo-
mically viable use of their property. 79 Thus, the disjunctive nature explicit in the
original formulation of the test is also implicit in its application80
71. Id. at 853-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 834 n.3.
73. See id. (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, the equal protection case of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,466 (1981), and the due process cases of Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88, and
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952)). Compare Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (requiring
that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest") with Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. at 466 (upholding a regulation if the state "could rationally have decided" that the regulation might
achieve state objectives).
74. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. See generally Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,410-i1 (1915)
(balancing a deprivation of economically viable use against the police power).
75. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
76. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the negative conjunctive form of the test).
77. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. Implicit in the negative conjunctive form of the test is a shift of the burden
of proof from the property owner to the government. This shift of the burden, although implicit in Nollan, is
made explicit in Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
78. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.
79. Id. at 834.
80. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
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C. Dolan v. City of Tigard-Finishing What Nollan Began
Under the first prong of Agins, the relevant inquiry is whether the regulation
"substantially advances legitimate state interests., 81 Justice Scalia, in his Nollan
opinion, recognized that the Supreme Court had not elaborated on what was a
"legitimate state interest" or what relationship satisfied the "substantially
advance" requirement.82 The "essential nexus" requirement introduced in Nollan
offered little help. 3 In Dolan, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the
degree of connection required between exactions imposed on a landowner and the
asserted governmental interest, as required under the first prong of Agins! 4
The plaintiff, Florence Dolan, was a plumbing and electric supply store
owner. She sought to expand her store and pave the parking lot, both of which
were adjacent to Fanno Creek which runs through the City of Tigard, Oregon. As
a condition to the granting of her redevelopment plans, the City Planning Com-
mission required Ms. Dolan to dedicate to the City the portion of her property
which fell within the 100-year flood plain of the creek and an additional fifteen-
foot strip adjacent to the flood plain which was to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway.
8 5
Before deciding whether the conditions imposed on the landowner satisfied
the nexus requirement of Nollan, the Supreme Court sought guidance from state
court decisions and undertook an examination of the standards used by a number
of states for evaluating the relationship between exactions imposed by a muni-
cipality and the impact of a landowner's proposed development! 6 While some
states accepted generalized statements about the connection between the exaction
and the impact of the development, this standard did not offer adequate protection
for property owners to satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements8 7 Also, the
"specific and uniquely attributable" test88 employed by some states was a more
81. Id.; NolIan, 483 U.S. at 834.
82. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
83. When deciding the Nollan case, the Supreme Court was not required to clarify what relationship
would satisfy the nexus requirement, as the exactions failed to meet even the most "untailored standards." Id.
at 838.
84. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2312 (1994).
85. Id. at 2314.
86. Id. at 2318-20.
87. ld. at 2318; see, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 190-91 (Mont.
1964) (upholding a Montana district court decision finding that a land exaction in exchange for a subdivision
plat map approval was permissible based upon the county's desire to promote the public comfort, welfare, and
safety); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. 1966) (upholding a fee and land exactions based
on abstract statements of need for recreational facilities in the community).
88. See Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (111. 1961) (holding that
burdens imposed upon a landowner must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the development
activity, or else the burdens would "amount[] to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the
constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police power").
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exacting standard than required by the Fifth Amendment.8 9 The Court believed
the intermediate standard adopted by a majority of state courts, the "reasonable
relationship" test, was closest to constitutional requirements? Despite the Court's
initial approval of the "reasonable relationship" test, Chief Justice Rehnquist
declined to employ the term "reasonable relationship" due to the confusing
similarity of the "rational basis" language of the Equal Protection Clause's mini-
mal scrutiny standard.9 He thought the phrase "'rough proportionality' best
encapsulat[ed] ... the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."2
Under the rough proportionality test, "[n]o precise mathematical calculation
is required," however, a city must make an "individualized determination" that
the costs imposed on an individual landowner are "related in both nature and
extent" to the impact of the landowner's development activities.
93
Applying the test to the conditions placed upon the expansion of Dolan's
store, the Court first analyzed whether there was an essential nexus between the
permit conditions and the legitimate interests sought to be advanced by the City. 94
Unlike Nollan where there was no plausible argument that lateral access across
the beach would increase visual access from the roadway, the conditions placed
upon Dolan's development would satisfy the essential nexus requirement. 95 The
expansion of Dolan's plumbing store would increase the impervious surface on
the property and contribute to the stormwater run-off into Fanno Creek.9
Similarly, if the City's assertions were true, the dedication of a bicycle/pedestrian
pathway would alleviate any increase in traffic congestion resulting from the
expansion, thus satisfying the essential nexus requirement.97
Accepting that the essential nexus existed between the permit conditions and
the City's interests in flood prevention along Fanno Creek and in the reduction
of congestion in the business district, the Court was next required to examine
whether the conditions were roughly proportional to the impact of the plumbing
store expansion."
89. Dolan, 114S.Ct.at2319.
90. Id.; see J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (applying a
"reasonable regulation" test in deciding that a zoning ordinance forced unconstitutional burdens on a
landowner), overruled on other grounds by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317,319 (N.H. 1988).
91. The significance of Dolan does not end at the clarification of the first prong; it was also an
additional attempt to distinguish Fifth Amendment standards from Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
standards. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court made a conscious effort to avoid confusion, and unequivocally
indicated that the first prong is not a due process standard. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The requirement that the government make an individualized determination that the dedication
is related to the nature and extent of the development to justify its imposition effectively shifts the burden of
proof from the landowner to the government. See id. at 2320 n.8.
94. Id. at2317.
95. Id. at 2318.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2318-22.
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The City contended, and probably rightly so, that the increase in impervious
surfaces on the Dolan property would increase the stormwater run-off into Fanno
Creek.99 The City, however, wanted more than the fifteen percent Dolan was
already required to leave as open space under the Community Development
Code.'l° The City wanted Dolan to dedicate all of the land within and fifteen feet
above the 100-year flood plain to the City as part of its greenway system, thus
depriving Dolan of the ability to exclude others from the land.' 10 Moreover, the
new construction could not intrude into the greenway area.0 2
The City did not explain why a public, rather than private, greenway and
flood plain were necessary to offset any increase in stormwater run-off.'0 3
Additionally, the proposed development would not encroach on any existing
greenway, and thus there was no need for Dolan to provide any alternate green-
way space.1 4 The Court concluded that the flood plain and greenway conditions
failed the reasonable relationship test.105 The City's findings that there would be
increased stormwater run-off due to the expansion of the plumbing store did not
show any reasonable relationship to the flood plain easements that the City
demanded.'0
The City's findings in support of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway also failed
the reasonable relationship requirement.'0 7 The City estimated that the proposed
development would increase traffic by an additional 435 trips per day.08 How-
ever, the City failed to establish that the requirement for the dedication of a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway was in proportion to any impacts of the proposed
development.1 9 Any relationship was merely speculative, and was based upon the
argument that the pathway "could offset some of the traffic.., and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion."' 10 Arguably, the pathway conditions were merely
a pretext to gain title to land the City wanted that would avoid eminent domain
proceedings and the need for the City to pay just compensation. 1




103. Id. at 2320-21.






110. Id. at 2321-22 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 2322 n.10. The City, in refusing to grant Dolan a variance from the pathway dedication
condition, stated that granting a variance conflicts with its adopted policy of establishing a continuous pathway
system. Id. That the permit condition was pretextual is the only reasonable explanation: It is implausible that
enough customers would ride a bicycle to make their plumbing purchases to offset any increase in traffic due
to the proposed development.
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D. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Agins' Second Prong
Clarified-What Is a Denial of Economically Viable Use?
Whereas the Nollan and Dolan decisions rested on the first prong of Agins,
the inquiry in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilf focused upon the
second prong: whether the regulation "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land.""'
In Lucas, the plaintiff purchased two beachfront residential lots on which he
intended to construct single-family homes 1 4 Prior to the purchase, the South
Carolina Legislature enacted its Coastal Zone Management Act, requiring land-
owners in the "critical area" of the coastline to seek approval from the South
Carolina Coastal Council prior to any development.1 s 1988 legislation, the
Beachfront Management Act, subsequent to Lucas's purchases, expanded the
"critical area" and prohibited construction within the "critical area."' 16 Unfor-
tunately for Lucas, his parcels fell within the expanded "critical area" and were
rendered valueless'
1 7
While examining whether Lucas's property was "taken" by the regulation, the
Court stated that there are two types of regulatory action that are compensable
without an inquiry into the governmental interest advanced in support of the
regulation: first, where the landowner suffers a physical invasion of the property,
and second, where the regulation denies the landowner economically viable or
productive use of the land.'
Notwithstanding these per se rules requiring compensation or an invalidation
of the regulation as applied, the Court acknowledged that not all regulations that
affect property values are compensable." 9 However, "regulations that leave the
112. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
113. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009-10. The issue of whether the regulation substantially advanced legitimate
state interests was not discussed. The plaintiff conceded that the Beachfront Management Act was validly
enacted pursuant to the State's police power and served the legitimate state goal of preserving South Carolina's
beaches. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 404 S.E.2d 895, 896-98 (S.C. 1991), rev'd and remanded,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
114. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
115. Id. at 1007-08.
116. Id. at 1008-09. The Court noted that the Beachfront Management Act still permitted some
construction, such as decks and walkways. Id. at 1009 n.2.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1015-16. Regulations that deny an owner all economically viable use are likened to physical
takings and are compensable, because as far as the owner is concerned, the denial of use is tantamount to a
physical appropriation. See id. at 1017; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267 (1946) (holding low flying
aircraft immediately above a landowner's property rendered the property useless and constituted a taking
because the low flying air traffic had the same effect as if the government had taken physical possession of the
property).
119. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922) (stating
that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law").
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owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use
... carry with them the heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm,"
thus justifying compensation without an inquiry into the government
objectives. 2
Justice Scalia conceded that the per se rule articulated by the Court did not
offer guidance as to what is a compensable denial of economically viable use.'2'
Justice Stevens in his dissent attacked the categorical rule requiring compensation
as lacking support from prior decisions, and more importantly, that the rule was
"wholly arbitrary."1 In Justice Stevens's view, "[a] landowner whose property
is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner whose property is
diminished 100% recovers the land's full value."1 3 In refutation of Justice
Stevens's argument that the rule arbitrarily provided for an all or nothing re-
covery, Justice Scalia turned to the three prong analysis of Penn Central,24 and
concluded that a landowner may still recover even though the deprivation is less
than complete. 12 Adoption of the deprivation of economically viable use standard
did not foreclose use of Penn Central.126 Thus, the categorical rule articulated in
Lucas is available to a plaintiff who is denied all economically viable use, while
a plaintiff whose denial of economically viable use is less than complete can seek
compensation or an invalidation of the regulation under Penn Central.27 For
landowners seeking compensation under Penn Central, the determination of
whether compensation is due will turn upon the owner's legitimate expectations,
the nature of the governmental action,128 and whether the restrictions were a part
of the owner's title in the first place. 29
120. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
121. Id. at 1016 n.7; see id (stating that the Court's lack of a clear standard as to when a deprivation of
economically feasible use requires compensation has produced inconsistent pronouncements).
122. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
125. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. Although Justice Scalia called for the use of the Penn Central factors,
he believed the Court erred in its analysis, using the landowner's total land holdings in the vicinity, rather than
the particular parcel burdened by the regulation, to determine the impact upon the landowner. Id. at 1016 n.7.
In Penn Central, the Court held that the determination whether a taking has occurred depends "upon the
particular circumstances in that case." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Although the Penn Central court has
been "unable to develop any 'set formula"' for examining takings, the determination is dependent upon "ad
hoe, factual inquiries" weighing three primary factors: first, the economic impact upon the claimant; second,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with legitimate investment-backed expectations; and finally, the
character of the government action. Id.
126. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
127. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's use of Penn Central to
refute Justice Stevens's view that the second prong of Agins provided for an all or nothing recovery).
128. The Supreme Court is more likely to find a taking if the governmental action can be characterized
as a physical invasion rather than an adjustment of benefits and burdens among members of society. See Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
129. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
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Although Justice Scalia likened a denial of economically viable use to a
physical taking, they are not one and the same. 3' The analogy between physical
invasions and denials of economically viable use served as a justification for the
per se rule requiring just compensation where the owner is denied economically
viable use.3 1 It would be unwise for landowners suffering a physical invasion of
their land to proceed under Lucas.132 Instead, landowners suffering a physical in-
vasion of their property have available the per se rule established in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.133 Under Loretto, a taking has occurred
and requires just compensation if the landowner is forced to suffer a physical
invasion of his or her property, regardless of the economic impact upon the land-
owner 34 Analysis of physical invasions under the second prong of Agins would
require the landowner to show there was a resultant denial of economically viable
use, which is contrary to the holding in Loretto, and would lessen the likelihood
of recovery by the landowner.
35
130. While a physical invasion requires just compensation regardless of the impact upon the landowner,
see infra notes 133-34, the per se rule requiring just compensation for a denial of economically viable use
requires the denial to be complete, not merely a relatively minor restriction upon the use of the property. See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980); see also Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,498 (1987) (holding that the denial of economically viable use was
to be measured by the effect upon the whole parcel, not a particular portion).
131. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16; cf San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,652
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that whatever the form of the burden imposed on a landowner,
condemnation or land use restriction, the effects upon the landowner and the benefits to society are the same).
132. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (describing the more easily satisfied rule of Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., which is available to landowners suffering physical invasions).
133. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the owner of an apartment building sued a cable television
company that had installed its transmission lines and distribution boxes on her building pursuant to a New York
statute, claiming that the intrusion constituted a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 421-22.
Although the intrusion into Loretto's property was small and did not interfere with the use and enjoyment of
the property, the Court held that it had "uniformly found a taking regardless of the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact
on the owner." Id. at 422, 434 (emphasis added). However, the extent of the invasion is a relevant factor in
determining the compensation due. Id. at 437. Earlier cases found takings on a variety of facts. See, e.g., Griggs
v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962) (holding that air flights at low altitude resulted in the taking
of an air easement requiring compensation); Causby, 328 U.S. at 267 (deciding that continuous low flights
resulted in the taking of an easement); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1922) (concluding that the firing of projectiles over private property constituted a servitude on the private
property); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917) (ruling that permanent flooding constituted a
taking requiring just compensation).
134. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434.
135. Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (requiring the landowner to suffer a complete denial of
economically viable use) with Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (holding that physical invasions are compensable
regardless of the economic impact upon the landowner).
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E. Ehrlich v. Culver City-A Taste of What Is to Come?
The Ehrlich v. Culver City36 decision, which remanded the case to the trial
court for reconsideration in light of Dolan on the next court day after Dolan was
decided, is an additional indication of what the Supreme Court will require under
the Just Compensation Clause. 137 In Ehrlich, a landowner wanted to construct
luxury townhomes on a site which formerly contained private recreational
facilities, including private tennis courts. 38 The City approved the project but
imposed a $280,000 mitigation fee for the loss of the private tennis courts, and
a $33,220 fee in lieu of a requirement that art be placed on the development
project.139 The question before the trial court was whether the imposition of the
fees constituted an unconstitutional taking of property within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment" 40
The trial court invalidated the mitigation fee upon finding that there was "no
reasonable relation" between the plaintiff's project and the need for public tennis
courts in the city.141 Finding no distinction to be made between public and private
tennis courts, the appellate court reversed, opining that the loss of private tennis
courts due to the landowner's development activities justified the imposition of
exactions to provide public community recreational facilities elsewhere in the
city. 42 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, then vacated the
decision and remanded in light of its decision in Dolan.143 Thus, although the
rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan pertained to the exaction
of interests in real property, the remand of Ehrlich intimates that the nexus and
rough proportionality requirements of the first prong of the Agins test may be
applicable to permits conditioned upon monetary exactions as well.' 44
136. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
137. By remanding Ehrlich in light of Dolan, the Court intimated that monetary exactions will be subject
to the same scrutiny as exactions of interests in land. Ehrlich, 114 S. Ct. at 2731.
138. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 1743, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (1993), vacated and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1744, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1750, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476.
143. Ehrlich, 114 S. Ct. at 2731.
144. See id.; Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (11 1995)
(applying a two-pronged Agins analysis to an impact fee imposed on new development). But see Home
Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that because
the agency that developed the water development fee at issue did not permit an adjudicative decision, the
"rough proportionality" standard of Dolan did not apply).
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F. Broad Applicability of the Nollan and Dolan Decisions
Agins established that in general, land-use regulations would be subject to the
requirement that the regulation substantially advance legitimate state interests.
145
Nollan and Dolan, which further developed this standard as requiring a "rough
proportionality" between the burdens imposed on the landowner and the land-
owner's development activities, have been characterized as applicable only to
exaction cases.146 However, there is support for the broad application of Nollan
and Dolan to cases outside of the narrow exaction context.47 The theoretical
bases for Nollan and Dolan are equally as applicable to costs imposed on
landowners through regulations that do not mandate the imposition of exactions,
yet substantially impair the value of the landowner's property. 48 Why deny an
examination under the rough proportionality standard, rather than the lower-
scrutiny "substantially advance" standard merely because the burdens imposed
on the landowner do not take the form of an exaction? From a landowner's point
of view, a regulation which destroys seventy-five percent of the landowner's
property value is no different from a requirement that the landowner deed
seventy-five percent of the land to the state. 49
145. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
146. Delaney, supra note 54, at 64.
147. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 n.14 (1992) (asserting that a
regulation which is applicable to landowners on a general basis, rather than individual landowners, should not
be immunized from attack on that basis, and to do so would render the Just Compensation Clause little more
than a restatement of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday Constitution:
The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735,783-85 (1988)
(stating that there is no principled reason to distinguish between physical and regulatory takings since what
is important is the impact upon the citizen); James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the
Right Direction, 25 ENVTr_ L. 143, 150 (1995) (arguing that there is no reason to distinguish between
adjudicative takings such as in Dolan, from legislative takings, and that the relevance of this distinction to the
protection of property rights is unclear). See generally Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 902 P.2d at 1353
(Grant, P.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that because the imposition of a water
resource development fee was a legislative determination and did not permit a "Dolan-like ad hoc, adjudicative
determination," the rough proportionality standard did not apply); Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
450 S.E.2d 200,203 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (upholding a city zoning ordinance requiring curbs, landscaping, and trees
in surface parking lots under the "rough proportionality" standard), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995).
148. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
provision of San Jose's rent control ordinance violated the Fifth Amendment by failing to substantially advance
legitimate state interests and that the landlord was not the cause of the harm the City sought to address); see
also Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y. 1989) (applying Agins's first prong,
as developed in Nollan, to a municipal ordinance preventing the conversion, alteration, or destruction of single-
room occupancy housing and holding that a taking had occurred); Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d
1083, 1086 (Or. 1993) (applying the disjunctive Aglns test and Nollan "nexus" requirement to a municipal
ordinance prohibiting transient occupancy and concluding that Agins was satisfied).
149. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that whatever the form of the burden imposed on the landowner, condemnation or land
use restriction, the effects upon the landowner and the benefits to society are the same).
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To justify the disparate treatment between exaction requirements and other
types of land-use regulation, such as zoning ordinances, the Court has attempted
to draw a distinction between legislative determinations classifying entire areas
of a city, and the ad hoc decisionmaking present in Nollan and Dolan.150 This dis-
tinction may be illusory, depending upon the level of abstraction with which one
views the nature of the governmental action. Although Nollan and Dolan
involved adjudicative decisions conditioning the issuance of building permits to
landowners on the conveyance of a portion of their property, the adjudicative
decisionmaking represented the implementation of a legislative determination
classifying a portion of the city, or in the case of Nollan, classifying a portion of
the state pursuant to the Coastal Act. 151 Therefore, the exactions at issue in Dolan
arguably were not solely the product of an ad hoc adjudicative determination, but
to the contrary, were part of a comprehensive land use plan required by the State
of Oregon and codified in the City of Tigard's Community Development Code
(CDC).'
5 2
The exactions required by the California Coastal Commission in Nollan,
much like those in Dolan, also represented the implementation of a legislative
determination.153 This determination, rather than classifying a portion of the city,
applied to all coastal lands within the State of California. When any development
by landowners seeking to replace single family dwellings would have an adverse
impact on public access to the sea, the Commission was authorized to condition
the permit approval on exactions to ensure public access.
154
These exaction requirements were not isolated to only a few landowners, but
were visited upon many. 55 In Dolan, the CDC applied the exaction requirements
to all development within the 100-year flood plain of Fanno Creek. 56 Similarly,
the exaction requirements challenged in Nollan had been applied to forty-three
out of sixty coastal development permits along the same tract of land; un-
150. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (attempting to distinguish cases that
involved generalized zoning and public health, safety, and welfare ordinances adopted pursuant to the
government's police power, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S.
365 (1926), and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), from the instant matter involving an
adjudicative determination and a greater focus of governmental power upon an individual landowner).
151. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106,30212,30600 (West 1996); see also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
152. The City also developed a Master Drainage Plan, codified in the CDC, to combat the increased risk
of flooding attendant with the increase in impervious surfaces due to new construction. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at
2313.
153. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106,30212,30600 (West 1996).
154. Id.
155. Pursuant to the CDC, all property owners in the area zoned "central business district" must comply
with open space requirements, and all landowners seeking to develop property adjacent to Fanno Creek's 100-
year flood plain must dedicate land suitable for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. See Dolan,
114 S. Ct. at 2313-14.
156. Id. at 2314.
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doubtedly the exactions were imposed along other portions of the California coast
as well. 57
Much of the Court's trepidation with respect to the adjudicative decision-
making present in Nollan and Dolan appears to be caused by the discretion that
an agency, whether the CDC or the Coastal Commission, may have in con-
ditioning development permits upon exactions.5 8 The discretion of an agency to
engage in ad hoc determinations requiring exactions increases the risk that
individuals will be forced to bear societal burdens and carries the possibility that
the government will attempt to circumvent the Just Compensation Clause or
engage in "out-and-out plan[s] of extortion." 9 The Coastal Act vested the
California Coastal Commission with the discretion to decide whether or not a
particular development would adversely impact access to the sea and accordingly,
whether to condition permit issuance on the exaction of an easement across the
property. t6' The discretion in Dolan took the form of the CDC's ability to grant
a variance161 if the zoning provisions would cause an "undue or unnecessary
hardship."162 Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the regulations in question
represented the implementation of legislative determinations and thus, should all
be subject to the same heightened level of scrutiny.'
63
The broad applicability of the "rough proportionality" standard is also sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's consistent reiteration that otherwise legitimate
uses of the police power may nevertheless result in an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.t6 For
example, Justice Holmes's statements that "if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking"' 65 and that "a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire to a shorter cut than the
157. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987); see Pacific Legal Found. v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 655 P.2d 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1982) (suit by a nonprofit
foundation and two property owners challenging the use of dedication conditions by the California Coastal
Commission); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985) (seeking
invalidation of a dedication requirement conditioning the issuance of a development permit). See generally
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30212,30600 (West 1996).
158. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at2318.
159. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citing J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atldnson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
1981)).
160. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (establishing the Commission's discretion whether to
permit an application upon an exaction).
161. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1553 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "variance" as "[p]ermission to
depart from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance by virtue of unique hardship due to special
circumstances regarding a person's property").
162. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
163. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (arguing that regardless of the form of the burden placed
upon the landowner, all should be subject to the same level of scrutiny).
164. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (asserting that a legitimate exercise of the police power
may result in a taking of property without just compensation).
165. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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constitutional way of paying for the change" are omnipresent in takings cases)6
Similarly, the Supreme Court's famous quote from Armstrong v. United States'67
stating that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee . ..was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" has almost become
a mantra to be recited in every takings analysis. 68 The spirit and intent of these
quotes embody the central principles of the Fifth Amendment: The right of
persons to own property, and that if the public, through the government, desires
it for its own purposes, the public must pay for it.
G. Summary-What Is Required Under the Two-Pronged Agins Disjunctive
Test?
The area of takings law remains uncertain and is at times contradictory;
however, some relatively clear and consistent pronouncements have arisen.'
69
Despite cries that it is a veiled attempt to revive the judicial subjectivism of
Lochner-era substantive due process, 70 courts now recognize that land use
regulations enacted pursuant to a state's police power may violate the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' This represents a dramatic shift
166. See id. at 416; e.g., Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 141 (7th Cir. 1981), affd in part, 728
F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836; Jacobsen v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928,
947 (9th Cir. 1977); Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 4 n.3
(W.D. Tex. 1995), afTd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 94 F.3d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996); Golemis
v. Kirby, 632 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.R.I. 1985); Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688, 693 (Cl. Ct. 1985);
Adams Outdoor Adver. v. East Lansing, 483 N.W.2d 38, 51 (Mich. 1992); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (N.Y. 1989).
167. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
168. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. An integral element of every takings analysis is the recognition that the
Fifth Amendment was intended to protect individuals from the imposition of burdens which should be borne
by society. As such, Armstrong is often quoted when explaining the purpose of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 n.4; First Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84, 106 n.15 (1985); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.,
450 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 902 P.2d at 1350; Taylor v.
Village of N. Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1995); Northern IlL HomebuildersAss'n, 649 N.E.2d
at 388; Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479,481 (N.Y. 1994).
169. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (detailing the United States Supreme Court's consistent
use of a disjunctive test); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(establishing a per se rule of unconstitutionality for physical invasions).
170. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (supporting the argument that the Agins line of cases is
a return to Lochner-era subjectivism).
171. See discussion supra Parts H.A.-D. (examining cases in which regulations enacted pursuant to a
state's police power were valid under due process, yet were invalid under the Just Compensation Clause);
supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing cases in which the Court acknowledged that a regulation may
satisfy due process, but still violate the Just Compensation Clause).
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away from the almost nonexistent protections under substantive due process in
the analysis of regulations affecting private property.
72
Examining land use regulations under the newly recognized protections of the
Just Compensation Clause, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
employed the two-pronged disjunctive framework of the Agins line of cases.
73
Under the disjunctive test, the landowner is owed just compensation if the
regulation either fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies
the landowner economically viable use of the land. t74
Where the regulation employs an adjudicative decisionmaking process to
determine whether an exaction will be required from a landowner, the Court will
apply the semi-strict heightened scrutiny articulated in Nollan and Dolan, rather
than the less exacting "substantially advance" requirement under the first prong
of Agins.175 Under these circumstances, the exactions imposed upon the
landowner must be roughly proportional to the potential burdens created by the
landowner's development of the property. 76
If the regulation denies the landowner economically viable use of the
property, regardless of whether an adjudicative decisionmaking process was used,
and irrespective of the government interest advanced in support of the regulation,
a taking will be judged to have occurred, and just compensation must be paid.
77
I. CALIFORNIA'S AND OHIO'S CONJUNCTIVE STANDARD
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court has oft stated that just compensation analysis is not given
to strict formulation 78 and that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
172. Under the Due Process Clause, a regulation will be upheld if the legislature might have concluded
it promoted public health, safety, or welfare, and that it is irrelevant whether any interest is actually advanced.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In property rights cases in the period between 1937 and 1980, only
one case, Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), found a regulation unconstitutional, but Morey was overruled
in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See Karlin, supra note 19 (citing B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTTUTION 6 (1980)).
173. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (acknowledging cases in which the Supreme Court has
relied upon the Agins disjunctive test).
174. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2316 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
175. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. Justice Scalia indicated that a wide variety of regulations that are
generally applicable, and do not require ad hoc decisionmaking, easily satisfy the substantially advance
requirement. Id. at 834-35.
176. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2319; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
177. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (stating that the governmental interests advanced
in support of a regulation are irrelevant when the owner is denied economically viable use of the land).
178. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that there is no
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" dictate just compensation be paid).
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every such change in the general law. ' 179 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the
Supreme Court has clearly created a two-pronged analytical framework for the
examination of regulatory takings claims1' s These recent developments stand in
stark contrast to the deferential analysis applied just a few decades ago.'8 '
In spite of the United States Supreme Court's consistent use of a disjunctive
either/or type test, courts in California and Ohio have held that the Agins, Nollan,
and Dolan cases support the use of a conjunctive test.182 Admittedly, state
applications of the requirements articulated in Agins, Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas
are widely varied, 83 but irrespective of these variations, the use of a disjunctive
either/or test is common to all other states.'9
4
B. Disjunctive Application of Agins v. City of Tiburon
Two recent New York cases, Seawall Associates v. City of New York 85 and
Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital,"a are exemplars of the proper application
of the Just Compensation Clause as developed in the Agins line of cases. More-
over, these cases recognize the distinction between the Due Process and Just
Compensation Clauses, and their respective standards. 187
In Seawall Associates, the owners of single-room occupancy housing chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a New York City law which not only prevented the
demolition or conversion of their properties, but required the owners to restore
units to habitability and rent them at controlled rates. 88 As an additional
"extortionary" measure, landowners subject to the law could buy their freedom
from its provisions by either paying $45,000 per rental unit demolished or
converted, or by constructing replacement rental units elsewhere in the city.!
8 9
179. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
180. See discussion supra Part II (recounting the development of the disjunctive standard).
181. See supra notes 2, 11 and accompanying text (providing cases in which the deferential standards
applicable under due process are employed).
182. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; discussion infra Part II.C. (exploring the use of a
conjunctive test by California's Fourth District Court of Appeal and the Ohio Supreme Court).
183. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (reviewing the various manners in which Agins is
implemented).
184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (establishing that nearly all states recognize the
disjunctive nature of the Agins test).
185. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
186. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1989).
187. Implicit in the application of the law in these cases is a recognition of the distinction between just
compensation and due process. See Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 485 (opining that the State's generalized
interests failed to satisfy constitutional requirements for such State action although such interests would have
been satisfactory under due process); SeawallAssocs., 542 N.E.2d at 1069 (rejecting the "indirect and at best
conjectural" connection between the means and the ends of the law as insufficient to satisfy the "substantially
advance" requirement although it would have satisfied due process).
188. SeawallAssocs., 542 N.E.2d at 1061.
189. Id.
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The court stated that whether viewed as a physical or regulatory taking, the law
violated the Fifth Amendment."g° After first invalidating the law as a physical
invasion of the plaintiffs' property, the court proceeded with an alternate analysis
under Agins.191
Applying the Agins test to the case, the court acknowledged its two- pronged
disjunctive nature stating, that satisfaction of "[e]ither would be sufficient to
invalidate a property use regulation."' 92 Under the denial of the economically
viable use prong, the regulation had the effect of stripping owners of any
profitability inherent in the property.93 The owners were required to put their
property to public service, whether or not the only economically viable use of the
property was to tear it down and construct a new building.'4 Moreover, the regu-
lation's requirements for the expenditure of funds to rehabilitate the properties,
and rental at controlled rates, destroyed the possibility of the property owners
disposing of the property with only minimal losses.' 95
The New York City law also failed the first prong of Agins, which requires
the regulation to substantially advance legitimate state interests. Although the
City's asserted interest was to prevent'homelessness, t96 the City's own study
showed that the law would do little to solve the homeless problem.' 97 Any
advancement of legitimate interests was at best, speculative and "conjectural."'9"
Speculative as it was, the nexus between the interest served and the means
employed failed to satisfy the "semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of
regulatory means-ends relationships."' 99
A few courts treat the first prong as a threshold issue, and if the regulation
fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests, the analysis never reaches
whether the regulation denies economically viable use of the land.2 ° In
Manocherian, apartment owners challenged a New York City rent stabilization
law requiring the apartment owners to offer renewal leases to not-for-profit
hospitals. 2°' The court held that the law failed to lessen substantially the housing
190. Id. at 1062.
191. Id. at 1065-66, 1068-69.




196. Id. at 1068 n.10.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1069.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401,410 (Neb. 1994) (holding that
a municipal zoning ordinance did not further legitimate state interests and was enacted arbitrarily and
capriciously, thus effecting a taking of the plaintiff's property, without an inquiry into whether there was a
denial of economically viable use); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(ending the court's inquiry after deciding that conditions imposed upon a landowner's development of the land
failed the first prong of Agins).
201. Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 480.
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shortage, or to prevent excessive rents or profiteering.2 The only effect of the
law was to subsidize the hospitals at the expense of individual apartment
owners.m The court found that the regulation failed to satisfy the first prong and
was therefore unconstitutional. 204 Since the City's law failed the first prong of
Agins, an examination under the denial of the economically viable use prong was
unnecessaryo'5 Applying the Agins test, the court stated that "even if the
economic impact aspect of this test were not to be satisfied, that feature alone
could not defeat the owners' interests and claims in a controversy such as this."206
C. Conjunctive Application of Agins v. City of Tiburon
A new line of cases ostensibly applying the two-pronged Agins test has
developed in California and Ohio.2 These California and Ohio cases apply Agins
conjunctively, requiring that a regulation must fail to substantially advance
legitimate state interests and that it must also deny the landowner economically
viable use of the land in order for the owner to recover. 208 The conjunctive appli-
cation may have resulted from courts confusing the United State Supreme Court's
use of the disjunctive 9 and "negative conjunctive" 210forms of the Agins test,
which in effect are identical.21 Although few in number, these cases set precedent
hostile to the protection of private property rights.
California has been recognized as an innovator in land use regulations.
21 2
However, the state's innovations, coupled with the narrow view of landowner
rights held by California courts, has resulted in an environment often hostile to
202. Id. at 484.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 483.
205. Id. at 482; see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1987) (finding that a
taking had occurred without an inquiry into whether the landowner was denied economically viable use).
206. Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 482.
207. Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 37 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1995); Central
Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 653 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio 1995); Gerijo v. City of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d 533
(Ohio 1994).
208. Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90; Central Motors Corp., 653
N.E.2d at 643; Gerijo, 638 N.E.2d at 538.
209. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating a regulation effects a taking if the
regulation fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies the landowner economically viable
use of the property).
210. The regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests, and
does not deny the landowner economically viable use of the property. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying
text (explaining the development of the negative conjunctive form of the test).
211. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (formulating the Agins test in the
negative conjunctive did not alter its application); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (arguing that,
due to confusion in the area of takings, courts have made inconsistent and contradictory rulings).
212. DENNIs J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTrrtrrIoN, SHAPING SocmTY THROUGH LAND
USE REGULATION 113 (1993).
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property rights.2" 3 For example, the California Supreme Court has held that the
just compensation provisions of the state and federal constitutions do not apply
to regulatory takings, a proposition that was later refuted by the United States
Supreme Court.1 California courts' restrictive view of landowner rights is
evident in the recent approval of a conjunctive test.21
The California case which exemplifies the conjunctive application of Agins
is Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside,2 t6 which was decided by California's
Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Del Oro Hills, a partnership, Del Oro Hills
(Del Oro), acquired a 300-acre parcel of property in the City of Oceanside?
17
Seeking to develop the property, Del Oro obtained city approval of a master
tentative subdivision map.218 The project was to be completed over a five year
period.2 9 Del Oro then obtained approval of a specific plan and planned develop-
ment master plan.220 The development would consist of smaller neighborhoods,
each of which would be sold to other developers for construction after Del Oro
completed the infrastructure.22 Additional permits, tract plans, and maps would
be required before a purchasing developer could build its neighborhood?
22
213. See COYLE, supra note 212, at 114-18; see also RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIMEON, THE
ZONING GAME REVISrrED 293 (1985) (noting that "[piractitioners in other states have joked about why a
developer would sue a California community when it would cost a lot less and save much time if he simply
slit his throat").
214. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979)
(holding that an invalid use of police power can never result in a takings claim), af'd, 477 U.S. 255 (1980).
"[W]hile such governmental action is invalid because of its excess, remedy by way of damages in eminent
domain is not thereby made available." Id. The only remedy available to a plaintiff would be an invalidation
of the unconstitutional regulation. See id.; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 311 (1987) (declaring that "the California courts have decided the compensation
question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment"). But see R.R. Hensler v. City of
Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 14, 876 P.2d 1043, 1051, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 252 (1994) (stating that a landowner
could receive compensation through an inverse condemnation action, in spite of the clear language in the earlier
Agins holding that an action under the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause was unavailable to
plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs could only seek an invalidation remedy). See generally CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19,
Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained
by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner. The Legislature may
provide for possession by the condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings
upon deposit into court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by the court to be
the probable amount ofjust compensation.
Id.
215. Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
216. Id.
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Del Oro recorded its master final subdivision map in 1986, then obtained the
necessary financing for the completion of the infrastructure.m Del Oro entered
into agreements for the construction of the infrastructure, and contracts for the
sale of several neighborhoods conditioned upon the completion of the infra-
structure. 4 After several of the sale agreements were forged between Del Oro
and other parties, Oceanside's voters approved a growth control initiative limiting
the number of dwelling units to be constructed in any given year.2 As a result
of the initiative's enactment, several of Del Oro's escrows were canceled and Del
Oro was forced to decrease sale prices and make monetary concessions to keep
escrows going.2 Del Oro alleged several causes of action, including an uncon-
stitutional taking of property without just compensation, based in part upon the
substantial decrease in the value of the property.?7
The California Court of Appeal analyzed the enactment of the initiative in
light of a conjunctive formulation of the Agins test.2- In concluding the Agins test
is conjunctive, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Agins test may be
stated in the negative conjunctive, but failed to recognize it is merely a refor-
mulation of the disjunctive test and does not alter its substance.YThe conjunctive
interpretation, contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent and the over-
whelming majority of state and federal courts,20 would require the plaintiff to
prove that the regulation both fails to substantially advance legitimate state
interests, and denies them economically viable use of the land. 1
The narrow view of landowner rights held by the court was belied by the
reasoning it used to conclude that the Agins test was conjunctive. The court
stated that "[f]irst, we cannot accept Del Oro's theory that satisfaction of one
element of the Agins test (i.e., that there was an invalid regulation) is enough to
establish a taking as a matter of law.' m2 The court continued to show either its
hostility toward the Agins test and landowner rights, or its lack of understanding
of takings jurisprudence when it misconstrued the United States Supreme Court's





227. Id. at 1070, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684.
228. Id. at 1078, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
229. Id. at 1074, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686; see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
negative conjunctive form of the Agins test).
230. See supra notes 20,24 and accompanying text (showing the overwhelming authority in support of
a disjunctive test).
231. Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
232. Id.
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In Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan, the United States Supreme Court's analysis
of the takings issue inextricably interlinked both the regulation's validity,
and the question of whether any economically viable use of the property
remained in light of the regulation. In light of later authority, Agins did
not establish an 'either/or' type of test?
33
Ironically, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan, the cases the court cites in support of
a conjuntive test, are the very cases which have established the disjunctive nature
of the Agins test?34 These cases explicitly state, and implicitly show the dis-
junctive nature of the two-pronged test 5
However, the "rough proportionality" standard of the first prong of Agins
may be the source of the court's misinterpretation that the analyses of the validity
of a regulation and whether it denies economically viable use are inextricably
interlinked2 6 Recall that under the rough proportionality standard, the impact of
a regulation upon a landowner must be roughly proportional of the impact of the
landowner's proposed development.27 Although under the rough proportionality
standard the restriction of possible uses to the property may be an important
consideration, the Supreme Court has never required a denial of economically
viable use as a predicate to a finding that the standard has not been met. This
mischaracterization belies the court's lack of understanding of the Agins test, and
to follow the court's interpretation would allow the first prong to subsume the
whole Agins test. Regardless of whether the court of appeal interpretation is an
intentional mischaracterization, or based on a lack of understanding of the Agins
line of cases, the Supreme Court's use of a disjunctive test cannot reasonably be
disputed.238
The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted recently the conjunctive form of the
Agins test also, over the objections of a minority of its justices. In Central Motors
v. City of Pepper Pike,239 and Gerijo, Inc., v. City of Fairfield,240 the Ohio court
explicitly stated that a landowner must "prove beyond fair debate, both that the
233. Id. at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690 (emphasis added).
234. See discussion supra Parts II.A.-D. (reviewing the development of the Agins test by the United
States Supreme Court in Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas).
235. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. In Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court decisions were
based solely upon the first prong. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834. Lucas, on the other hand, was decided under the second prong: whether the regulation denied the owner
economically viable use of the land. See discussion supra Part II.D. (examining the Supreme Court's
clarification in Lucas as to what is a denial of economically viable use).
236. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
237. Id.
238. See discussion supra Part II (detailing the development of the disjunctive test).
239. 653 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio 1995).
240. 638 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1994).
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enactment deprives him or her of an economically viable use and that it fails to
advance a legitimate state interest. ' 241
The development of the conjunctive standard in Ohio began with Columbia
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Montgomery.242 The court in Columbia Oldsmobile examined
a municipal zoning ordinance in light of a two-pronged test requiring the land-
owner to prove the ordinance "denies them the economically viable use of their
land without substantially advancing a legitimate interest in the health, safety, or
welfare of the community." 243 The constitutional basis for this test is unclear since
the court made no mention of specific provisions of the United States Con-
stitution or the State of Ohio Constitution. Although the court cited Penn Central,
as well as Goldblatt v. Hempstead244 and Euclid v. Ambler,245 due process cases,
and various Ohio cases in support of its conjunctive test, Agins and its progeny
are conspicuously absent.246 Similarly, the majorities in both Gerijo and Central
Motors failed to address the Supreme Court's holding in Agins.
Ohio Supreme Court Justices Wright and Pfeifer objected in both Central
Motors and Gerijo to the majority's use of a conjunctive test. Justice Wright
concluded that, "[the conjunctive test] effectively strips individuals of rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution .... Although states may afford
individuals greater rights than those afforded under the federal Constitution, states
cannot deprive individuals of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 247
Because the conjunctive application of the test fails to afford individuals the full
protections mandated by the federal Constitution, the conjunctive standard is
likely to be found unconstitutional.248
241. Gerijo, 638 N.E.2d at 538 (emphasis added); see Central Motors, 653 N.E.2d at 643.
242. 564 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 1990).
243. Columbia Oldsmobile, 564 N.E.2d at 457.
244. 369 U.S. 590 (1962); see id. at 596 (upholding a "safety regulation" enjoining the operation of a
sand and gravel pit on the grounds that it was a reasonable exercise of the police power).
245. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see id. at 395 (stating a regulation violates due process and is unconstitutional
if its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare").
246. Columbia Oldsmobile, 564 N.E.2d at 457.
247. Central Motors, 653 N.E.2d. at 645-46 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only); see supra notes
31-32 and accompanying text (affirming that the federal constitution establishes a minimum level of protection
for individual rights which the state cannot fall below).
248. See Central Motors, 653 N.E.2d at 645-46 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only); see also supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text (establishing that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, federal enactments and constitutional protections take precedence over state constitutions and
enactments).
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IV. RE-EXAMINATION OF NOLLAN, DOLAN, AND LUcAs UNDER A CONJUNCTIVE
STANDARD
To understand fully the implications of a conjunctive application of the Agins
disjunctive test, it is necessary to undertake a re-examination of recent United
States Supreme Court takings cases in the light of a conjunctive test. Not a single
plaintiff has faced a conjunctive test at the Supreme Court level, for if they had,
modem jurisprudence with regard to the Just Compensation Clause would be very
different. The plaintiffs in Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas faced a disjunctive test
which protected all of their property interests under the Fifth Amendment, and
were judged to have suffered takings without just compensation. 249 However, had
a conjunctive standard been applied, not one of these plaintiffs would have
recovered2so
A. Nollan Revisited-The Coastal Commission Eases on Through the Just
Compensation Clause and the Public Can Ease on Through the Land-
owner's Property
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court applied the two-pronged Agins
disjunctive test to the California Coastal Commission's requirements that con-
ditioned the issuance of the plaintiffs' building permit on the exaction of an
easement across the plaintiffs' property.25 The Court's analysis and decision were
based entirely on the first prong: whether the regulation substantially advanced
legitimate state interests. s2
Requiring the plaintiffs to also sh 9w that the regulation denied them
economically viable use of the property would have defeated their claims. They
did not argue that the regulation denied them economically viable use, nor could
they plausibly have argued that prong.a53 Although the regulation required them
to grant an easement in favor of the public to a portion of their property, thus
constituting a diminution in value of the whole, it did not necessarily constitute
a denial of economically viable use of the property.25 The right to pass and repass
249. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
250. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.-C. (examining the effects of a conjunctive standard upon the
decisions in Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas).
251. See discussion supra Part II.B. (examining the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nollan).
252. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
253. See infra note 254 and accompanying text (arguing that plaintiffs like the Nollans who have merely
suffered a diminution in the value of their property have not ipso facto suffered a denial of economically viable
use of their property).
254. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827; Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 175-76,
212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 596 (1985) (holding that although an exaction causes a diminution in value of the whole,
it is not a deprivation of substantially all reasonable use); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987) (holding that the value that has been taken from the property must be
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along the dry sand portion of the beach, as made possible by the easement, would
not have interfered with the Nollans' use or enjoyment of their property;
moreover, they would have retained title to the land, subject to the easement in
favor of the public Y15 The Nollan plaintiffs would still have had the ability to
construct their new home, unlike the Lucas plaintiffs who were required to leave
their property idle, 6 or if they chose not to rebuild their beachfront bungalow,
they could likely have sold the property at a profit, unlike the apartment owners
in SeawallAssociates.257 Because the categorical rule for denial of economically
viable use as articulated in Lucas is not available to plaintiffs who have only
suffered a diminution in value,258 the conjunctive standard cannot be satisfied.259
The Nollan plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the denial of economically viable use
prong, regardless of the regulation's failure to satisfy the first prong, would have
proven fatal to their claims and would have denied them just compensation under
the conjunctive standard. The California Coastal Commission would have been
able to force the Nollans to permit the public to ease on through their property.
B. Lucas Reconsidered-Mr. Lucas, You Have What the State Wants, So
Hand It Over
Recall that whereas the decision in Nollan rested upon the first prong of
Agins, Lucas rested upon the second prong of Agins: whether the landowner is
denied economically viable use.m Under the second prong, the United States
Supreme Court has categorically required just compensation when a landowner
is denied economically viable use, regardless of the government interests ad-
vanced.2t The conjunctive application of Agins fundamentally changes this
approach and brings the government's interests back into the compensation
equation. If the government can demonstrate a legitimate state interest sub-
stantially advanced by the denial of economically viable use, under a conjunctive
measured against the value that remains in the property); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 130-31 (1978) (holding that the diminution in value is to be measured against the value of the parcel as
a whole).
255. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 855 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992).
257. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1066 (N.Y. 1989).
258. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text (demonstrating that unless the denial of eco-
nomically viable use is complete, a landowner cannot proceed under the categorical rule established in Lucas).
259. See supra note 254 (asserting that an exaction requirement does not necessarily constitute a denial
of economically viable use).
260. See discussion infra Part II.B., C. (examining the holdings in Nollan and Lucas).
261. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (likening a deprivation of all economically viable
use to a physical invasion because as far as the landowner is concerned the effect is the same).
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application the Fifth Amendment inquiry is complete 6 2 Regardless of the
economic impact of the denial of use upon the landowner, the landowner will be
denied just compensation.2 63
Mr. Lucas did not challenge the validity of the Beachfront Management Act
(Act) as a lawful exercise of the State's police power under the Due Process
Clause before either the South Carolina courts or the United States Supreme
Court Mr. Lucas also conceded the first prong of Agins, recognizing the
importance of South Carolina's goal of the preservation of its sensitive beach/
dune system, and that construction upon his beachfront lot would contribute to the
erosion and destruction of this valuable public resource.265 However, to recover
under the conjunctive standard, Mr. Lucas would have been required to challenge
whether the Act substantially advanced legitimate state interests. 66
In furtherance of the State's legitimate goal in the preservation of the coast-
line, the Act absolutely prohibited any construction of occupiable structures upon
the property, and provided for no exceptions.267 There was no adjudicative pro-
cess or danger of abuse of discretion as present in Nollan or Dolan, and the Act
represented a legislative determination classifying a portion of the state.268
Because there was no danger of an abuse of discretion, based upon the Supreme
Court's holdings in Nollan and Dolan, the "rough proportionality" requirement
arguably would not apply. 69 The Act would only be required to substantially
advance legitimate state interests, amorphous as that standard may still be
70
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court has indicated that a wide range of
regulations, including landmark preservation and zoning ordinances, satisfy this
262. Under the conjunctive standard, the burden is shifted back to the landowner to show that the
regulation fails both prongs of the test. See Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1079,
37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,689-90 (denying that Agins established an either/or test, thus requiring the landowner to
prove that the ordinance denies the landowner all economically viable use in addition to proving the first
prong), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 86 (1995). Therefore, if the government can establish that the regulation
substantially advances a legitimate state interest, the landowner cannot satisfy both prongs, and the inquiry
must end. See id.
263. See Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1074, 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686, 689-90 (requiring both
prongs of the test to be satisfied).
264. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896-99 (S.C. 1991), rev'd and remanded,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
265. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
266. See Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90 (utilizing a conjunctive
standard).
267. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992).
268. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (justifying the imposition of heightened
scrutiny because an adjudicative decision was used to determine whether conditions would be placed on the
landowner's development); see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (arguing that the danger of
abuse of discretion justifies some form of heightened scrutiny).
269. See supra notes 56-59, 268 and accompanying text (justifying the imposition of heightened
scrutiny).
270. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (showing that where there is a danger of abuse of
discretion, heightened scrutiny is justified).
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requirement.271 Due to the direct relationship between the prohibition on con-
struction and the resulting prevention of harm to the State's legitimate interest in
protecting the beach/dune system, the Act as applied to Lucas's property easily
satisfies the "substantially advance legitimate state interests" standard. Because
the regulation can satisfy the first prong of Agins, the conjunctive test is therefore
not satisfied, and Lucas would be denied just compensation under this standard.
Lucas would have had to meet the demands of the State and give the State his
property.
C. Dolan Re-Examined-Individuals Can Be Forced to Bear Societal
Burdens Disproportionately
Much like the plaintiffs in Nollan and Lucas, the Dolan plaintiff would also
have suffered without compensation under the conjunctive standard. Regardless
of the failure of the regulation to satisfy the first prong of the test, the plaintiff
nevertheless still possessed the ability to rebuild her plumbing store and pave the
dirt parking lot, deriving greater economic benefit than before reconstruction, and
thus making satisfaction of the conjunctive test impossible 
72
Recall that under the conjunctive standard, in addition to satisfaction of the
first prong, the landowner must be denied economically viable use of the land to
recover.273 Notwithstanding that the requirement that Dolan deed portions of her
land to the City would diminish the value of her parcel of land, the requirements
that she dedicate land to the City for flood protection and pedestrian/bicycle
pathway projects would not constitute a denial of economically viable use of the
whole parcel of land.274 The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in
a footnote and opined: "There can be no argument that the permit conditions
would deprive petitioner 'economically beneficial use' of her property as she
currently operates a retail store on the lot. Petitioner assuredly is able to derive
some economic use from her property."275
Although Dolan would be singled out to bear disproportionately the costs
associated with the City's goals of offering flood protection, increasing open
space, and facilitating the use of pedestrian/bicycle pathways as alternate modes
of travel, because she was not denied economically viable use there would be no
recovery under the conjunctive standard.
271. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987).
272. The proposed expansion of the plumbing store would nearly double its size, and was expected to
increase the traffic to the store. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
273. See supra notes 231-33, 242 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the conjunctive
test).
274. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that Dolan was required to give the City title to
the portion of her property which fell within the Fanno Creek flood plain, plus an additional 15-foot strip to
be used as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway).
275. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2316 n.6 (1994).
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V. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF A CONJUNCTIVE STANDARD UPON
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS?
The questionable constitutionality of the conjunctive Agins test is evident
when applied. The disjunctive test protects two of the various rights landowners
possess under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause: the right to be
free from regulation that falls to advance legitimate state interests and the right
to put private property into productive use.276 If either of those rights are abrid-
ged, just compensation must be paid.277 The conjunctive standard dramatically
changes this. Only if the offending regulation abridges both of those interests,
must compensation be paid.278 For example, no recovery is available when a
regulation that advances legitimate state interests completely denies the owners
economically viable use of their property.279 In these circumstances, the state
should exercise its power of eminent domain and compensate the landowners for
the property taken.2 0 This instance, where the property's value is destroyed yet
no compensation will be forthcoming, is repugnant to the values underlying the
Just Compensation Clause. It cannot be harmonized with Supreme Court holdings
in which a taking is found to have occurred when a regulation forces an individual
to bear disproportionately a burden which in all fairness "should be borne by the
public as a whole." 2s Moreover, it is inconsistent with Justice Holmes's statement
that where a regulation goes "too far" it too will be deemed a taking. 2 Thus it is
clear-the conjunctive standard eviscerates the protections that the Fifth
Amendment provides for landowners against gross overreaching by the
government.
Conversely, the conjunctive standard will not invalidate an admittedly bad
regulation which falls to advance any state interest. Only if the regulation also
denies the owner economically viable use of the property will there be a com-
276. The protection of these interests is evident from the formulation of the Agins test. See Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Property has also been conceptualized as a bundle of sticks composed
of the various rights inherent in private ownership of property, the most fundamental of which is the right to
exclude others. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). Property rights have also been
described as the right to "possess, use and dispose of" the property. See United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373,377-78 (1945).
277. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987):
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
278. See Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 689-90,
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 86 (1995).
279. See id.
280. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (requiring payment
ofjust compensation because the regulation denied the owner economically viable use of the land).
281. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
282. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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pensable taking. 3 This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's holdings in
Nollan and Dolan. Landowners may still seek redress under the Due Process
Clause.28s However, under the minimal scrutiny standard applicable to economic
regulations, it is unlikely any plaintiff will recover. 
6
Landowners in California and Ohio may now face an almost insurmountable
challenge when seeking compensation for regulations which impose uncon-
stitutional exactions or deny them economically viable use of their property. Had
the United States Supreme Court applied a conjunctive standard in Nollan, Dolan,
or Lucas, none of the plaintiffs would have recovered. The same fate awaits the
claims of plaintiffs who, although burdened by failed regulations or denied
economically viable use of their property, are unable to satisfy both prongs. Thus,
the conjunctive application of Agins effectively removes the Just Compensation
Clause from consideration by many landowners who are forced to dispro-
portionately bear societal burdens.as
While Agins and its progeny increased the burdens placed upon land use
regulators to ensure that individual citizens were not singled out to dispropor-
tionately bear the costs of implementing societal goals, adoption of the con-
junctive standard effectively eliminates that burden.2 9 The conjunctive standard
gives land use regulators the choice of which prong they wish to satisfy, and as
such, the conjunctive standard is an easy burden for the government to meet.
Careful land use planners will be capable of crafting regulations which may
seriously restrict or deny all economically viable use, yet will satisfy the require-
ment of substantially advancing legitimate state interests. The converse is also
true: Irrespective of how badly a regulation fails to advance any governmental
283. See Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90.
284. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (reciting the negative conjunctive form of the Agins test); Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834 (holding that a taking had occurred without an inquiry into whether the plaintiff had been denied
economically viable use).
285. See discussion supra Parts 1, II (discussing the relationship between the Due Process and Just
Compensation Clauses).
286. See supra notes 2, 11 and accompanying text (setting forth the minimal scrutiny standard under the
Due Process Clause that is satisfied if the legislature might have concluded the regulation promoted the public
health, safety, or welfare).
287. See discussion supra Part IV (re-examining the claims of the property owners in Nollan, Dolan, and
Lucas under the conjunctive standard). The Nollan plaintiffs were not denied economically viable use of their
property by the regulation at issue. See supra note 254. Conditioning the issuance of a permit to construct a
new dwelling upon the granting of an easement along the beach failed only to advance legitimate state interests.
See Nollan, 438 U.S. at 834. Similarly, the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, that denied the Lucas
plaintiffs economically viable use, survives scrutiny under the conjunctive standard because it substantially
advanced legitimate state interests in protecting valuable coastal habitats. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. Thus, none
of the plaintiffs were capable of satisfying the conjunctive standard and none would have recovered.
288. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960); discussion supra Part IV (re-examining
Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas under the conjunctive standard).
289. Under the rough proportionality standard, a city is required to quantify its findings and make an
individualized determination that the conditions imposed upon the landowner are related to both the nature and
extent of the landowner's activities. See Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2319-20.
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interest, it will be upheld if the land use regulator is clever enough to leave the
owner with some form of economically viable use.
Presumably, under the formulations of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
of California and the Supreme Court of Ohio, the economic impact upon the
owner and interference with the owner's legitimate investment backed expecta-
tions that are taken into consideration by the Penn Centra190 factors are also now
irrelevant as an independent basis for a constitutional claim. To the extent that
Penn Central remains viable, it is essentially an alternate inquiry to Agins, to be
used if the denial of economically viable use is less than complete.291 Because the
conjunctive standard requires the landowner to be completely denied eco-
nomically viable use of the property, in addition to satisfying the first prong of
Agins, it is unlikely that these courts will allow any recovery under Penn
Central292 By definition, if landowners are seeking recovery under Penn Central,
they cannot recover under the conjunctive standard because there has not been a
complete denial of economically viable use.293
What viable cause of action does this leave a property owner? Although the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause would be effectively eliminated
from consideration by the almost insurmountable burden under the conjunctive
standard, an aggrieved property owner may nonetheless still seek redress under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, although recovery will be
unlikely.294 The minimal scrutiny standard of the Due Process Clause applicable
to economic regulations is extremely easy for legislative enactments to satisfy.295
Property regulations fall within the classification of mere economic regulation
and will be upheld if the legislature "might have concluded" that the regulation
promoted the public health, safety, or welfare.296 Surprisingly, it is irrelevant
whether any legitimate governmental interest is actually advanced.297 Unless the
connection between the regulation and the governmental interest sought to be
advanced is completely irrational, it will most likely be upheld.2 98
290. See supra note 125 (setting forth the Penn Central factors that are used to determine whether a
taking has occurred, and are applicable if the denial of economically viable use is less than complete).
291. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text (explaining that Penn Central provides for recovery
by landowners who are subject to regulations that do not completely deny the landowner economically viable
use of the property).
292. See Del Oro Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
293. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate use of Penn Central).
294. See infra notes 295, 301 (citing cases that show the presumption of constitutionality and difficult
burdens a plaintiff is required to carry under the Due Process Clause).
295. Economic regulations enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. See United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Since the decline of Lochner-era substantive due process review,
the courts have refused to second guess the judgment of the legislature. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
731 (1963).
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Regardless of whether the landowner proceeds under the Just Compensation
Clause, or is forced to proceed under the Due Process Clause due to the difficulty
of satisfying the conjunctive standard, the burden of proof will be placed upon the
landowner rather than the government.299 While the Supreme Court placed upon
the government the burden of proving the propriety of the regulation in cases
arising under the Just Compensation Clause, the conjunctive application of the
Agins test effectively shifts the burden of proof from the government to the land-
owner. The government needs only to prove the regulation satisfies one prong of
the test to thwart any recovery by the landowner. Thus, contrary to the dictates
of Nollan and Dolan that placed the burden on the government, the landowner
must prove the regulation fails both prongs of the Agins test to prevail. 3 Should
a landowner choose to proceed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than face the conjunctive standard, the landowner will also
have to carry the burden of proof.3"1 Due to the strong presumptions in favor of
constitutionality and the minimal rationality standard under the Due Process
Clause, this is a very onerous burden for plaintiffs to carry.
302
While many state and local governments, and even a Supreme Court Justice,
decried the Agins line of cases as a severe restriction on the ability of cities and
states to engage in land use planning,30 3 the holdings in Del Oro Hills, Central
Motors, and Gerijo represent the other extreme.304 Knowing that land use regu-
lations are unlikely to result in a taking under the conjunctive standard, and that
the planning decisions of state and local governments will continue to be given
great deference under the Due Process Clause, state and local governments are
299. In Del Oro Hills, the court did not explicitly place the burden of proof on the landowner, Del Oro
Hills, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1079, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90, but the Ohio Supreme Court has explicitly done
so. See Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 653 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Ohio 1995); Gerijo, Inc. v. City
of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ohio 1994). But see Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (stating that "the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development") (emphasis added); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (holding that where
the State seeks to sustain regulation that denies land of all economically viable use, the State must show the
prohibited use was not a part of the owner's title to begin with) (emphasis added).
300. See supra note 299 (highlighting the shift in the burden of proof from the government t6 the
landowner).
301. The modem Court has almost completely withdrawn from the review of regulations affecting
property. See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731. Due to the great deference given legislatures, and the strong
presumptions of constitutionality, legislatures are required to do little if anything to justify economic or land-
use regulations, thus causing the plaintiff's who seek to invalidate such regulations to carry a heavy burden.
See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487; Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320
n.8 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
302. See supra notes 295, 301 and accompanying text (pertaining to the presumption of constitutionality
afforded economic regulations and the heavy burden on landowners under the Due Process Clause).
303. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra note 19 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 276-99 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the use of a
conjunctive test).
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likely to feel free to push the envelope of land use regulation? 5 The long-term
ramifications of Del Oro Hills, Central Motors, and Gerijo remain to be seen, but
the immediate effects are readily apparent; property owners seeking compensation
for takings effected by burdensome or ineffective regulations are less likely to
prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of when just compensation must be paid to a landowner will not
likely be settled at any time in the foreseeable future. As long as there is private
ownership of property in the United States, the conflict between private property
rights and the government's desire to regulate land for the benefit of society will
remain. As new societal needs and awarenesses arise so will the demand for more
regulations; however, this demand must be tempered by the constitutional
protections afforded individuals for their property rights. This is not to imply that
states should not remain free to experiment, but only that states must remain
cognizant of the rights of individual property owners, however laudable their
goals may be.
The conflict between individual rights and governmental goals is actively
under litigation in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.306 Upon remand from the United
States Supreme Court, the California Appellate Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling
in an unpublished opinion, and again denied relief to the Ehrlich plaintiffs." 7 The
Supreme Court of California has reviewed the Court of Appeal's ruling, con-
cluding that the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary
exactions in addition to possessory exactions, 38 and that the City met its burden
of demonstrating the required nexus.30 However, the court concluded that the
amount of the exaction was excessive and failed to satisfy the rough propor-
tionality requirement. 310 Reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the court
remanded the case for a determination of what monetary exaction would satisfy
the rough proportionality requirement.3
The recent developments in Ehrlich are evidence that state courts are experi-
menting with more expansive applications of the Agins line of cases, and un-
305. Where land use regulators are aware that regulations will be deemed noncompensable and not in
violation of the Just Compensation Clause, government is not forced to bear the cost of taking private property,
and regulators are given an incentive to overregulate. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 198-201 (1988).
306. See discussion supra Part II.E. (examining the remand of Ehrlich in light of Dolan).
307. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (1993).
308. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 859, 911 P.2d 429, 433, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 246
(1996).
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doubtedly, the application of Agins to monetary exactions and property regu-
lations in general is not a dead issue.312 Given the tenor of the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in the Agins line of cases, their willingness to cast a
skeptical eye upon land use regulations, and the consistent use of a disjunctive
test, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will allow the conjunctive application
of Agins to persist. Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Del
Oro Hills, this may not be taken as a tacit approval of a conjunctive test.313
Undoubtedly, a case applying-Agins conjunctively, which presents the factual
scenario and procedural history that four of the nine justices will deem proper for
review will eventually arise, and only then will we know.
312. See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961
(1995); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
313. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (stating a denial of certiorari "imports no expression
of opinion upon the merits of the case"); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Ind., 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950)
(explaining that a denial of certiorari "simply means that fewer than four members of the Court deemed it
desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion") (citations omitted).
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